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Life Projects: Passion versus Rationality
Abstract:
Philosophers of all ages and locales have ruminated on what it means to live a meaningful life.
This particular essay seeks to tackle the same question but with more particularity. Is a
meaningful life ethically good, rational, or even successful? Susan Wolf’s work The Meanings of
Lives gives a nuanced but affirmative answer. This essay counters Wolf’s answer to that
question. Although Wolf’s notion of having a project does make for a meaningful life, this paper
argues that her objective and subjective criteria are too restricting. What makes life meaningful is
not the outcome or nature of the project, but rather that one feels “called” to a particular project
and takes an active interest in it, even if the project seems absurd or futile. In order to support
that claim, this essay forwards Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, as well as other critical
appraisals of both Wolf and Kierkegaard.

Cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am)
-Rene Descartes

Imagine a person who spent their entire life collecting paper clips. This collection has no
greater purpose or agenda in mind; the person in question simply devotes their life to collecting
paper clips because they feel like collecting paper clips. Is such a life meaningful? A philosopher
like Susan Wolf would reply negatively, using their sense of rationality to disprove the idea that
a life of collecting paper clips is worthwhile. Thus, such a life is meaningless. Nonetheless, the
“call” of the paper clip collection still bears some meaning for the collector, as paradoxical and
absurd as it may seem. Thinkers like Soren Kierkegaard call for an embrace of this paradox
when it comes to living our lives in a worthwhile manner. In order to come close to finding an
answer regarding what it means to live a meaningful life, we must seek a hybrid path that takes
the best of both rational and suprarational approaches. After a thorough probing of both
Kierkegaard and Wolf, I propose such a hybrid path. Meaning and absurdity are not binary
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opposites, but rather coexist in a peculiar way. I believe that this peculiar balance is what gives
our lives meaning and will begin by analyzing the work of Susan Wolf.
In her essay The Meanings of Lives, Susan Wolf lays out certain criteria for what it means
to live a meaningful life. According to Wolf, a meaningful life has two components: a subjective
component and an objective component. The subjective component states that a meaningful life
has some sort of reward. However, this reward is not necessarily tied to pleasure or happiness.
The subjective component also calls for engagement in your life; in others, you must go beyond
simply “going through the motions.” On a different note, the objective component has three
parts. First, a life must be engaged in a project of some kind, be it a job, a relationship, or some
other objective. Wolf leaves the term “project” vague so as not to limit certain activities from
being meaningful. However, this project must have some kind of positive value. Second, we
must be actively engaged in that project. Finally, that project must somewhat successful for a life
to be meaningful. Wolf also notes that lives can still have meaning “even if they are, on the
whole, judged to be immoral.”1
Wolf’s objective and subjective categories are based on rational assessments of feelings,
emotion, and actions. Soren Kierkegaard offers a different take on the same categories in his
work Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments. According to
Kierkegaard, only the objective is based on rationality. For Kierkegaard, objective analysis is
based on observation and acceptance of those observations.2 Thus, Kierkegaard’s notion of
objectivity can encompass Wolf’s subjective and objective components for living a meaningful

Susan Wolf, “The Meanings of Lives,” in Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings, ed.
Perry, Bratman, and Fischer (New York: Oxford, 2007), 67.
2
Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1941), 230.
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life. The other category, subjectivity, is not based on rationality and acceptance. Rather,
Kierkegaard claims that “subjectivity is essentially passion, and at its maximum an infinite,
personally interested passion for one’s eternal happiness.”3 Moreover, this “interested passion” is
not something that can be comprehended by an outside “third party”; it is inherent to the
individual.4 Kierkegaard’s subjective category covers what Wolf’s purely rational, or objective,
approach misses. Wolf’s “subjective” category is not truly subjective, but rather an extension of
reason to emotion, something which cannot be easily quantified, if at all. Wolf’s supposedly
“subjective” component is merely a rational assessment of pleasure. Wolf even seems to
misunderstand what reward actually is. A “reward” cannot be explained without addressing the
pleasure that it brings someone. Thus, Wolf’s subjectivity misunderstands the vital relationship
between reward and pleasure. Kierkegaard’s approach accepts pleasure for what it is: something
that is experienced on an individual level and that cannot be extended to all people in the same
manner as a scientific law can. Moreover, pleasure by itself is fleeting. No one constantly feels
pleasure and nothing else. Interest, on the other hand, is engaging, intriguing, and constant.
Kierkegaard’s combination of the two anchors emotion down in a way that Wolf cannot.
That being said, Wolf’s approach is well-thought out and worthy of praise. Her desire to
leave the notion of a project vague does an excellent job of allowing for a variety of different
ways to live meaningfully. However, I take issue to a number of the specific components of
Wolf’s prescription. In general terms, Wolf’s ideas are too restrictive because they focus solely
on rationality and do not address anything that may be considered suprarational or irrational.
More specifically, Wolf’s subjective component is highly restrictive in that it requires a
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meaningful life to be satisfying. Oftentimes, our most meaningful experiences are not satisfying.
As a collegiate distance runner, I put my body through an enormous degree of hardship in any
given week. Sometimes, we run our event, in my case the 10,000 meter run, faster than we ever
have before. This does create satisfaction. However, failing to achieve a certain goal is not
satisfying in any way. Failure, a notion which I will return to later in this analysis, is a specter
that constantly lurks on the edges of the track. All it takes is one missed opportunity, and the sore
muscles and thirty minutes we spent running circles around the track suddenly are not in the least
bit satisfying. It is sheer pain. However, we do learn from failures. In my case, I may have
needed to start increasing my pace earlier or started out slower so that I have more in the tank
when I finish the race. The fact that this race was not satisfying bears no impact on the meaning I
got from it.
Now I will turn to Wolf’s objective components. The idea of life requiring a project to be
meaningful is not an issue. Neither is the “active engagement” portion of the requirements.
However, I would like to dispute the notions that this project “requires” positive value and a
degree of success. When dealing with the notion of success, history provides examples of
projects that ultimately failed, but still had a degree of meaning. During World War II, Colonel
Claus von Stauffenberg was a decorated German war hero who suffered grievous wounds in
combat and went back to Germany to be treated. In Germany, senior Wehrmacht army officers
recruited him into a plot to assassinate Hitler and oust the remaining Nazis from power via coup.
The officers involved in The “July Plot”, as it was known, sought to kill Hitler in his “Wolf’s
Lair” headquarters and then initiate the coup so that Germany could be saved from a reckless
two-front war. In July 1944, Stauffenberg planted a timed suitcase bomb in the Wolf’s Lair and
waited for it to go off. Once the bomb detonated, he left for Berlin to aid the coup. However, a
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different officer moved the suitcase after Stauffenberg left. The last-minute location change
shielded Hitler from the blast and left him almost unscathed. Hitler’s survival ensured that the
Valkyrie coup failed, and all of the conspirators, including Stauffenberg, were either executed or
committed suicide.5 His entire project was derailed by one man who just happened to move a
suitcase. According to Wolf’s philosophy, it follows that a random event entirely outside of our
control (the suitcase getting moved) can totally negate our life’s work. I do not agree with such a
fickle picture. Stauffenberg’s life was far from meaningless; he stood against one of the most
maniacal leaders of all time in an attempt to save his nation. Stauffenberg did everything that he
could in service of his project: he set the bomb up and attempted to start the coup. The chance act
of some random officer moving the bomb does not negate all of Stauffenberg’s work. He went
against the grain and took a stand when many others witnessed evil and followed along with it,
justifying their actions with “I was only following orders.” A random event does not carry the
same significance as Stauffenberg’s noble plan.
Wolf and “Moral Saints”
Susan Wolf is also clear that a meaningful life is not necessary a moral one. She
continues this strand of thought in her essay Moral Saints. Susan Wolf’s core argument is that
moral perfection is not a good model for living. Wolf defines a person who lives, or attempts to
live, a perfectly moral life as a “moral saint.”6 They come in two varieties: the Loving Saint
(who is moral because they love being moral) and the Rational Saint (moral because they view it
as their duty).7 Wolf regards this as a poor way to live because a moral saint is required to
disregard their own happiness and preferences in an attempt to live as morally well as they

History.com, “July Plot,” A&E Entertainment Networks, 21 Jan. 2016, http://www.history.com/topics/july-plot.
Susan Wolf, “Moral Saints,” Journal of Philosophy 79 (Aug. 1982): 420.
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possibly can. Moreover, Wolf suggests that this emphasis on morality makes for “a barren life”
because you cannot have any interests that are not related to living a morally perfect life.8 Even
more detrimental, in the opinion of Wolf, is that devotion to morality strips a moral saint of their
“selfhood”, or idea of self.9 A Loving Saint will eventually lack a sense of self entirely because
they are absolutely devoted to morality. On the other hand, a Rational Saint will be forced to
deny the self because they reach the conclusion that you cannot be split between a having an idea
of self and utter devotion to morality.10 Regarding the issue of positive value, Wolf does not
provide any parameters as to what exactly “positive” means. If positive value is taken to mean
morally good, then a person seeking to live meaningfully will soon run into trouble. Sometimes,
the absurdity of life requires us to engage in a project that seems to have negative moral value,
such as Abraham having to sacrifice his son Isaac to prove his faithfulness to God. The ritual
sacrifice of one’s own son is clearly negative and goes against what society often views a
parent’s fundamental duty to protect their child.11 Thus, Abraham fails to meet Wolf’s
classification as either a Loving Saint or a Rational Saint. However, Kierkegaard says that “With
Abraham it is different. In his action he overstepped the ethical altogether and has a higher telos
[purpose] outside it.”12
Herein lies the problem with Wolf’s approach. The idea of “morality” varies
considerably based on the time and place in which it is defined. Since we live with different
ideas about morality than Abraham, the application of modern morality to his time creates
absurdity and inconsistency that Wolf’s purely rational approach is ill-equipped to handle.
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Kierkegaard’s claim about Abraham’s “higher telos” suggests that we require a different
standard for evaluating action. Clearly, morality, or what is considered “ethically good”, cannot
provide a steady framework for finding meaning in life because it is dependent on some sort of
context. Edward Lawry primarily claims that what is considered morally good stems not from an
act itself, but rather from the broader framework that an act fits into. Lawry explains his position
with an analogy:
The Good isn’t just the “moral good” if we think of “moral” as qualifying particular acts.
But the Good is moral insofar as it picks out the best life. If we ask what is the best act,
playing golf or helping your neighbor with her plumbing problem, perhaps we reluctantly
say the plumbing help. But does the best life never include golf? While no one is
motivated to play golf because of its superiority over some imagined act of great moral
worth, they are motivated to play because it is “better”, all things considered, than
anything else they may actually substitute for it on a particular Saturday morning13.

In other words, Wolf’s focal point on analysis of acts by themselves is too restrictive when it
comes to evaluating morality. Certain acts certainly have a quality of “goodness” about them,
even if they are not by themselves the superior moral option. However, humans are not always
aware of what action provides the best route for “becoming themselves.”14 Lawry calls this
uncertainty “para-natural ignorance…the question of how to best live.”15 I believe that “paranatural ignorance” refers to something else. “Para-natural ignorance” stems from the fact that we
all have some sort of calling in our lives. How can we feel a yearning for meaning in life if we
had no primal instinct that life was worth living? Boiling down the complexity of humanity, as
Wolf does, to merely what we do disregards an entire facet of our existence: pathos. Humans are

Edward Lawry, “In Praise of Moral Saints,” Southwest Philosophy Review: The Journal of Southwestern
Philosophical Society, 18 (2002): 3.
14
Ibid.
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more than mere automatons clanking our way through existence before we run out of fuel and
waste away. We do not live according to Wolf’s objectivity, which emphasizes rational
assessments of purpose. Neither do we simply accept observations without questioning them.
Instead, we have feeling and emotion that defy, contradict, and sometimes transcend logic. Such
feelings leave us with questions. Thus, Lawry’s use of the term “ignorance” is a bit of a
misnomer. In my opinion, Lawry is actually referring to a yearning that all people have. We may
not comprehend this yearning, or why it exists, but it exists nonetheless. We recognize this
yearning as a quest for meaning in life.
Coming to terms with Kierkegaard
Notions of suprarationality are prevalent in Kierkegaard’s work. A primary idea in
Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling is the attempt to become truly faithful, which requires one to
rise above aesthetic and ethical modes of thinking. Once we do so, we arrive at a faithful mode
of thinking that is “above” rationality, or suprarational.16 In order to sort this out, Kierkegaard
uses the story of Abraham’s attempted sacrifice of Isaac and other invented tales, such as that of
the lad and the princess. Kierkegaard describes the situation in the following way: “A young lad
falls in love with a princess, the content of his whole life lies in this love, and yet the relationship
cannot possibly be brought to fruition, be translated from ideality into reality.”17 In order to
become faithful, Kierkegaard argues that this lad must first become resigned to fact that the
relationship will never occur. Thus, he becomes a “knight of resignation.”18 Then, the lad must
then believe “on the strength of the fact that for God all things are possible” that the relationship

David W Crowe, “Lecture on Kierkegaard’s Problema I” (lecture given during HONR 103, Rock Island, IL, April
2016).
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Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 70-71.
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will nevertheless happen19. Kierkegaard’s God is can be described as totaliter aliter, which is a
Latin term meaning “pure possibility”20. I again quote Kierkegaard: “With Abraham it is
different. In his action [obeying God’s command to sacrifice Isaac], he overstepped the ethical
altogether, and had a higher telos [purpose] outside of it.”21 Kierkegaard calls this “higher telos”
faith. However, I believe that this “telos” is instead a raw calling that lies in all humans. Upon
first glance, this makes no sense at all. However, Edward Mooney, a professor at California State
College at Sonoma, thinks otherwise. For Mooney, the lad and princess metaphor is
Kierkegaard’s way of evaluating human relationships.22 Mooney believes that this metaphor
represents taking interest in an “appropriate object.”23 That object is also something you desire
for the object itself, not for what that object may bring you. I believe that Mooney’s ideas also
provide a strong framework for determining how a project can have meaning. I believe that a life
project requires some form of “calling”, a primal instinct that pulls you toward a certain
objective. In order for a life to be meaningful, you must desire your project because you feel a
raw, instinctual attraction to it. Engaging in a certain activity because you want to make money
does not fit the bill. Just as Kierkegaard’s notion of God is “pure possibility” and able to be felt
in an infinite number of ways, so to can a person feel any number of callings in their life. This
calling is subjective in a Kierkegaardian sense because the pull that one feels from their calling is
a form of “passionate interest.” This differs from Wolf’s subjectivity in that the passion refers
not to the reward or pleasure that it brings, but rather refers to a strong magnitude of the interest.
Pleasure is a completely different emotion altogether. The imposition of an artificial barrier on
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what brings meaning, namely limiting it to the rational, eliminates a huge number of ways to live
meaningfully. It makes no rational sense for a doctor to leave his or her comfortable home and
administer medicine in war-torn countries abroad, but there are doctors who still make that
choice. To label those lives as meaningless would be unfair at best and an insult at worst. Thus,
we cannot use rationality as a standard for measuring a meaningful life.
A different but still helpful analysis of Kierkegaard comes from Nancy Crumbine.
Crumbine compares Kierkegaard’s depiction of Abraham with that of Meursault, the main
character in Albert Camus’ The Stranger. Both of these men are confronted by the absurdity of
the world around them. Meursault takes this absurdity to mean that the world is only an illusion,
with life being a kind of malady that ends with death.24 On the other hand, Kierkegaard’s
treatment of the paradoxes present in existence allows for the potential of rebirth. This rebirth
stems from becoming a knight of resignation and then a knight of faith.25 Differences also arise
between Abraham and Meursault in how they view the world. In the story of Abraham,
Crumbine believes that Isaac represents both past and future. Thus, Abraham’s attempt to
sacrifice Isaac shows that he is willing to sacrifice both his past knowledge and future concerns
in order to live freely in the present without fixation on knowledge (or lack thereof).26 This
conduct falls into line with Kierkegaardian subjectivity in that Abraham frees himself of
constraint by rational assessment of his choices. Instead, he lets his impassioned interest in
serving God dictate his course of action. Meursault, in contrast, lapses back into past knowledge
and concludes that life is meaningless.27 I think that Meursault’s view, as Crumbine describes, is
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similar to that of Wolf in that it focuses strongly on the observable. Thus, it bears similarities to
Wolf’s objectivity and subjectivity in that after a rational reflection upon his life, Meursault
concludes that life has no meaning. He utterly lacks interest in anything28 and totally misses
Kierkegaard’s subjectivity. It even focuses too much on the observable in that you end up
neglecting the present. Sometimes, in our present lives, we come across paradox and events that
simply cannot be comprehended on the strict basis of past experience. I do not doubt that past
experience can have value in determining how one should live, but it should not be the sole
determinant. Sometimes, finding a purpose for living can seem contradictory or unexplainable.
One might feel inexplicably drawn to one project and utterly repulsed by another. These deep
yearnings are not sentiments to ignore. The past and future are constantly growing, but the
present lies only in a moment. What ultimately matters is that one has a purpose to guide them
when confronted with the absurdity of life, even if one does not know why they have that
purpose. This purpose can be distinguished from a gut feeling in that one’s purpose is not
impulsive in nature but rather inherent. A gut feeling can go just as easily as it arrived, but a
purpose remains constant. In my opinion, reflection on the past or anticipation of the future can
dispel a gut feeling, but a true “calling” will survive those cognitive exercises. Ethics and success
are good things take with on the journey toward that goal, but they are not the goal itself.
Counters of Kierkegaard
One potential issue with Kierkegaard is that he writes from a Christian standpoint, which
means that his ideas are also intertwined with Christian thought. I do not view this as a bad
thing, but some may object to Kierkegaard’s ideas on religious grounds. Thus, in this section, I
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will seek to alleviate these fears. The Jewish faith does not view the Isaac incident in the same
way as Kierkegaard does. Jewish theologians see the Isaac sacrifice as a moment of moral
responsibility for both God and Abraham, instead of a suspension of ethics along Kierkegaardian
lines. God knew all along that Isaac would live, so the commandment to sacrifice Isaac was
simply God’s way of “trying the righteous” and making Abraham known to the world as a man
of faith.29 Thus, Abraham can be seen in a similar light as Job.30 However, there are intellectuals
who believe that Jewish scripture does contain suspensions of ethics, which would allow for
Kierkegaard to be reconciled with Jewish theological thought. Jacob Helavi points out that one
of God’s commandments is to honor your mother and father. But since Abraham left his mother
and father to venture into what would become the Promised Land, he violated this
commandment. This should make Abraham a poor example of faith; however, God allowed
Abraham to violate one of His commandments because Abraham’s father was an idolater.31
Although God essentially grants Abraham clemency, this is still a suspension of ethics (God’s
law) that matches Kierkegaard’s ideas. Furthermore, Kierkegaard’s subjectivity and objectivity
have applications beyond religion. If we embrace our passion and interest in the same way that
Kierkegaard embraces absurdity, then we will be able to explore the plethora of things that can
make our lives meaningful without the constraint of rationality. This embrace of absurdity
applies to all faiths. Jewish theological thought, on the other hand, seeks to explain Abraham’s
conduct within the framework of its own faith and religious laws. There is nothing inherently
wrong with such an approach; however, that approach also lacks the universality that goes along
with Kierkegaard’s ideas.

Roland Green, “Abraham, Isaac, and the Jewish Tradition: An Ethical Reappraisal,” Journal of Religious Ethics
10 (1982): 4. In this case, “trying” is used in legalistic way, i.e. the verb form of “trial.”
30
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31
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A New Formula
My prescription of a meaningful life draws primarily from Kierkegaard but also contains
pieces of Wolf’s ideas as well. It has two parts. First, I agree with Wolf that a meaningful life
requires some kind of project. I also like how Wolf keeps the requirements of that project vague
so as to not arbitrarily limit what can and cannot be considered meaningful. For me, a
meaningful life can be found by having a concrete life goal that you are constantly working
towards, and one that can be improved if you reach it. Second, this project requires some kind of
“calling.” Your life goal must also result from some kind of primal yearning, one that may not
necessarily be explainable. In this way, a person will find some kind of greater purpose in their
life. It may, or may not, come from a God. As long as ones feels totaliter aliter, or pure
possibility32, in whatever they choose to do, their life will have meaning. This yearning is not
quantifiable, but not everything in the human experience can be explained or numbered. Reason
certainly has its usefulness, but it also possesses limits. If one ignores what they do not
understand, they risk becoming mired in their own paradigm. You begin to “go through the
motions” and life ceases to be anything more than a cycle. Furthermore, success does not make a
life meaningful. What is the meaning of a life that has success but no passion behind it? Such a
life is empty and inadequate. Finally, a meaningful life does not have to be ethically good. Just as
the past and future are ever changing, so too is our sense of morality. A meaningful life requires
constant criteria for evaluation, and morality does not fit the bill. It is my sincere hope that
having a “called”, improvable goal is all that one needs to live meaningfully.

32
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